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0. Introduction 
It is not entirely clear when Indian or Buddhist logicians began to use the term'the specific 
indeterminate'(astidhara~anaikantika) to indicate a category of fallacious logical reasons 
(hetvabhtisa). The Buddhist logician Dignaga (ca. 480-540) may have been the first to use this 
term.1 But even before Dignaga we can find t・aces of attempts to categorize such a fallacious 
logical reason, which is a specific property of tl1e subject of a thesis(J) ak~a), and whose examples 
can be found neither in the si1nilar instance (sapak~a) nor in the dissimilar instance (vipak~a).2 
This strange fallacious logical reason apparently concerns the t・aditional inductive character 
of the Indian or Buddhist logic. In Indian logic, when one tries to prove something, one must 
indicate concrete examples except the subject of a thesis, in terms of which he confirms the 
inevitable connection between the logical reason (hetu) and what is tobe proved (sadhya). That 
Dignaga recognizes the s~ecific indeterminate as a category of fallacious logical reasons means 
that Dignaga's logic stil retains the traditional inductive ch紅acterof Indian logic, although he 
strives to make a consistent system of formal logic. 
However, this inductive character of traditional Indian logic is由asticallytransformed by 
Dharmakit・ti (ca. 600-660). He inherited Dignaga's thought, but modified his inductive logic 
forwards a type of deductive system. And in accordance with this transformation of the system of 
logic, the interpretation of the specific indeterminate must be necessru・ily changed.3 In what 
follows, I would like to examine how Dharmakirti re-inte1-prets the concept of specific indetermi-
* I am very grateful toPmf. Nobuhiro Kaga and Ms. Sophie Kidd who kindly corected my English. 
1 Inthe Pramiirasamuccaya, Dignaga critcizes Vasubandhu for not using the term'specific'in order to 
clasify indeterminate falacious logical reasons in his Vidavidhi (cf. PS 8a7f.: ~nas ni ma grub 
dbye ba brjod ma yin I'khrul pa la yang b1jod ma yin/Ide ni~yin I'gal ba mi'khrnl pa can 
yang I; H. Kitagawa (1965), Indo koten,.onrigaku no kenkyu, Kyoto: 39). Therefo1'e,Vasubandhu probably did not 
use the term in his theory of falacious logical reasons and Dignaga perhaps introduced this term to the theory of 
falacious logical reasons. Prof. Ishitobi asumes that Dignaga probably aplied the term'asidhirara', which 
originaly meant a particular (svalak~·aiw) as anobject of an perception (cf. PS I 4a), tothe theory of falacious 
logical reasons (cf. M. Ishitobi (1981),‘、Indoronrigaku ni okeru hetvibhisa" [On hetvibhisa in Indian Logic], 
Bukkyogaku 12, 63—84: 73f.). 
2 For example, the term'the mark which is recognized as separated from (al) other things'(thams cad mi 
mthun par dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid;一切異類可得相）inthe Sa17ulhininoca1asatra (cf. Peking No. 74, N 57a3; T 
vol. 16, 710a4), as a later commentator interpreted it, might have been a similar concept to Dignaga's'specifc 
indeterminate'(cf. Y. Kajiyama (1984), "Bukkyo chishikiron no keisei" [The Origins ofBuddhist EpistemologyJ, 
Koza Daijo Buk灼6,vol. 9, 2-101: 57f.). 
3 It iswel known that Ratnakarasanti (ca 1 c.) regru・ds the specific indeterminate as a valid logical reason from 
ツ(%'ぷ •' . ·.· '・は必冷,.~ ,t・メ，ー，｀.J..
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nate. However, it is not correct to regard this re-interpretation of the specific indeterminate by 
Dhru・m放祖ias a mere result of the development of his new theory of logic. We should rather say 
that Dharmakirti has established his new deductive logic in confrontation with this difficult 
problem of the specific indetenninate. 
In the following sections, I wil frst summarize Dignaga's definition of the specific indeter-
minate. Then I wil investigate Dhru1nak.Irti's interpretation of this.concept. Finaly, I wil present 
the hypothesis that this confrontation with the specific indeterminate is cmcial for the develop-
ment of Dhru-m皿 ・ti'slogic. 
1. Dignaga on asiidhiira~ziinaikiintika 
Prior to investigating Dharrnakirti's interpretation of the specific indeterminate, we must 
exa1nine how Dignaga originally defines this logical reason. 
1.1. The position of asidhirat1i1aiki1tika in the hetucakra 
As is well known, the concept of specific indeterminate appears in Dignaga's hetucakra, i.e., 
'Wheel of reasons'. The hetucakra is an invention of Dignaga's which is described in his early 
work, the Hetucakra~amaru.4 The hetucakra is a list classifying nine sorts of logical reasons 
according to whether they wholly exist, partially exist or do not exist, both in the similru・ inst皿te
and the dissimilar instance. In terms of this list, Dignaga divides the logical reasons which 
satisfy the pak~adharnuztva, i.e., the first condition of the three forms (trairupya), into four groups, 
that is to say, a valid group and tlu・e fallacious groups, nrunely, the contJ.・adictory (viruddha), the 
general indeterminate (sti.clharaiicmaikiintika) and the specific indeterminate (asadhti.ra~iin-
aikti.ntika). The specific indeterminate is the fifth type in the hetucakra and is located at the 
center of the Wheel. This concept means the fallacious logical reason which exists neither in the 
similar inst皿cenor in the disimilru・ instance. Dignaga shows皿 ex血 pleof the logical reason 
in the following syllogism: 
[Thesis] Sound (sabda) is eternal (nitya). 
[Reason] Because (it is) audible (sriva!latvit).5 
'Audibility'(§1.avaiiatva) is specific to the subject of a thesis, n皿 ely'sound'.And no other 
thing than the subject of a thesis has'audibility'. Therefore, the logical reason,'audibility', exists 
neither.in the similru・ instance nor in the dissimilar instance. 
Thus, Dignaga considers that there is a logical reason which is specific to the subject of a 
an Antarvyaptivadin's point or view (cf. AVS l 13,4f.; note 4). The change ofthe evaluation of this logical rei:1son 
coresponds tothe historical development of antarvyiptivcida in Buddhist logic. 
4 Cf.E. Frauwallner (1959), "Dignaga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung," WZKSO 3, 83-164: 90, 162f. 
5 er.PSY(K) 13lbl f.: phyogs kyi chos dgu po'di dc1g go rims ci Ira ba bzhin du dpe da1g sbyar bar bya ste I 
gzhal bya yi1 pa'i phyir rtag go I byas pa'i phyir mi rtag go I mirtag pa'i phyir rtso/ ba las byung ba'o I byas pa'i 
phyir rtag go I ~I rtsol ba las byu1g ba'i phyir rtag go I mirtag pa'i phyir rtsol ba 亀
las byu1g ba ma yin 10 I rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir mi nag go I reg par bya ba ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhes bya 
bade mams bsdu ba'i tshigs su bead pa 1i I g功albya byas dang mi rtag dang I byas dang 111ya1 nmg rtsol las 
byu1g I mi rtag rtsol byw1g reg bya min I rtag sags mams la de dgu'o I (PS ll 21) de I tarphye bas gtan tshigs 
da1g I'gal ba dang I ma 1ges pa mams b,jocl par bya ste I; Kitagawa [ 1965: 187f.] 
.,. 9 9: •. •. :i: ぶスがが；し； ・:i.・: ・,;.' 
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thesis叩 dtherefore exists neither in the similar inst皿cenor in the disimilru・ instance, designates 
this logical reason as the specific indetenninate皿d,excludesit from valid logical reasons. This 
concept as defined by Dignaga shows that Buddhist logic obviously retains its inductive charac-
ter until the age of Dignaga.6 
1.2. Sriiva~iatva from the point of view of the trairupya 
How is this logical reason regarded from the point of view of the traintpya? Dignaga refers 
to this issue in the Svarthanumana chapter of his Prama!Jasamuccaya. There he classifies logi-
cal reasons according to whether they satisfy or do not satisfy each condition of the tlu・ee forms 
(trairapya)，皿denumerates six cases except the two cases in which al tlu・ee conditions are 
satisfied or unsatisfied. Note that Dignaga gives as an example of the fallacious logical reason 
which satisfies the first condition(pak~adharmatva) and the third condition (asapak:je'sattvam) 
but not the second condition (sapak:je sattvam), the folJowing syllogism: 
[Thesis] Sound (sabda) is non-eternal (anitya).1 
[Reason] Because (it is) audible (sriva1atvit). 
Namely, Dignaga regards'audibility', which is indicated as an example of the specific inde-
terminate in the hetucakra, as the logical reason which satisfies the third condition of the three 
fonns.8 
That Dignaga reg紅ds'audibility'assatisfying the呻 dcondition of the three forms is re-
lated to his view of negative concomitance (vyatireka). Namely, he claims that vyatireka is 
confirmed by'mere non-perception'(adarsanamti.tra).9 According to this idea, a logical reason 
6 Logic possessing this inductive chru・acter is caled the theory of'the external concomitance'(bahirvytipti). 
However, usage of this term is not found in the Buddhist literature until AI呵a'sHetubinduffkti. Cf. HBT 63,23; 27; 
see also T. Funayama (1994), "8-seiki Nalanda shusshin chishakuka oboegaki―Bukky6 chishikiron no keifu—" 
[Notes on Commentators from the 8th Century Nalanda in the Buddhist Prama.iia-Tradition], The Journal of the 
Nippon Buddhist Research Association 60, 49-60: 60. 
7 Itis noteworthy that the thesis of this syllogism'sound is non-eternal'is contradictory tothe thesis of the 
syllogism'sound is eternal'wli.ich is indicated as an example ofthe specific indeterminate. In terms of Ii.is exchange 
of the sadhyadharma, the similar and dissimilar instances are exchanged. However, both sylogisms are similar in 
that thei.J・ logical reasons are'audibility'which isspecifc tothe sound, the subject of a thesis. 
8 Cf. PSV(K) 11 b3f.: ts/111i re re'am g1yis gnyis kyi I rtags 1i do1 gyi don byed 11i1 I (PS I 6cd) de la 
tshul 1-e re'i ni gang 1jes su dpag pa kho na la yod kyi I dedang mtshungs pa la med la I demed pa la med pa ma yin 
pa dang I dedang mtshimgs pa la yod kyi I,jes su dpag par byas la med la I demed pa la med pa'ang ma yin pa 
dang I demed pa la med kyi I rjes su dpag parbya ba la med la de dang mtshwigs parbya ba la'ang med pa'o//tshul 
gnyis gnyis ni I dper na 1jes su dpag par bya ha la yod la I de la mtlnm pa la yod la I demed pa la med pa ma yin pa 
dang/.dang/dedang 
mthtm pa la yod la I demed pa la med cing I 1jes su dpag par bya ba la med pa ste I gra1 rshigs lrar snang ba drug 
po'di shugs kyis dgag par rigs par bya'o I de'di Ira ste I byas phyir sgra 1i rtag pa如1gI lus ca1 phyir da11g g加 I
11i1 phyir I lus 11i1 pltyir da11g !1/,~ mig gi gz1mg bya'i pl,yir//(PS I 7); Kitagawa [1965: 
I02f.] 
吋heview in which vyatireka is confirmed by mere non-perception (adarsanamtitm) was hitherto ascribed to 
Isvarasena, a teacher of Dharmakirti (cf. E. Steinkelner (1966), "Bemerkungen zu Isvarasenas Leh revom Grnnd," 
WZKSO 10, 73-85; do. (1991), "The Logic of the svabhiivaheru in Dharmakirti's Vida1ytiya," in Swdies in the 
Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, Wien, 311-324). Prof. Katsura, however, has recently claimed that this view 
can be traced back to Dignaga's semantic theory (cf. S. Katsura (1992), "Dignaga ru1d Dhru・makirti on adarsanamlitm 
● l !,; • 
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'audibility'satisfies出etlm・d condition of the three forms only because it is specific to the subject 
of a thesis and therefore cannot be found in the dissimilar instance. 
1.3. asadhara~anaikantika and the problem of the contraposition between sadharmya-
drf厄ntaand va沿'harmyadr~仰nta
Dignaga also refers to the specific indeterminate in relation to the example (dr~fiinta) in the 
D[S血tadr~tantabhasachapter of the Pram励asamuccayavrtti.There opponents claim that only 
a statement of ilie dissimilar example is sufficient because the content of出esimilar example 
(siidharmyadr~fiinta) is indicated by the disimilai・ example (vaidharmyadr~·ranta). Dignaga 
counters this紅gumentby saying that出especific indeterminate would be a valid logical reason 
if only a statement of the dissimilar example is suficient.10 That is to say, because of山especific
indeterminate Dignaga could not explicitly claim that only a statement of the disi1nilar example 
is sufficient, although he mentions the contraposition between the similar and the dissimilar 
examples in another place.1 
Thus, Dignaga's concept of specific indetenninate is deeply concerned with the problem of 
the contraposition between the similai・ and the dissimilar examples (or the one between出esec-
ond and the third conditions of the th.i・e forms, in Dharmak:Irti's term, the one between anvaya 
and vyatireka). Dignaga's above-mentioned explanation apparently implies that the specific 
indete1minate could be a valid logical reason if one admits the cona・aposition between the si~ar 
and ilie dissimilar examples. Thus, at a later period, when Dhai・mak血 consistentlyclaims the 
contraposition between anvaya and vyatireka, he had to re-interpret the meaning of the specific 
indeterminate as a fallacious logical reason. 
2. Dharmakirti's approach to as叫'hiira~naikantika
For Dhaimak:Irti, the theory of fallacious logical reasons is primai・ily the topic of a section of 
the Par記hanum面achapter. However, the issue of the specific indeterminate is so significant for 
the basic theory of his system of logic that he dealt with this issue in his earliest work, the 
Pran俎ftavarttikasvavrtti,in which he established his own theory of the logical nexus, the essen-
tial connection (svabhavapratibandha). 
and anupalabdhi," Asiatische Studien 46/1, 222-231). Dignaga's position that the specific indeterminate logical 
reason satisfies the tlru・d condition of the tlu匹 formsis easy to understand if we acept Katsura's claim. As we shal 
se later (cf. section 2.2.2.), Dharmakirti says:'Depending on mere non-perception, (Dignaga) has explained that 
(the specific logical reason) has only the negative concomitance (vyat加ka)'.That is, Dharmakirti himself probably 
ascribes the view in which vyatireka is confirmed by mere non-perception to Dignaga. 
IU Cf. PSV(K) 149a6:'on te'dir bsgrub bya med named pa nyid nye bar bstan na I mirtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba 
las byung ba'o z/1es bya ba,（ti la nyes pa ci z/1ig yod ce na I dper na rtag pa nyid ni mnyan par bya ba yin te I mirtag 
pa la med pa'i phyir thun mong ma yin pa yang rtag pa nyid la gtan ts/rigs su'gyur ro I; Kitagawa [ 1965: 252). 
1 Cf. Nyiyamuk/ui, T vol. 32, 3a3：或由義準一能頻二；PVSV18,17: arthipatyi vinyata1-ei1obhayapradarsanぷ；
S. Katsura (1981), "lnmyo shorimonron kenkyi (3)" [A Study on Nyiiyamukha (3), Hi,-oshima Daigaku Bungakubu 
Kiyo 41, 61-82: 71 f. 
i.:,io ・ • • :.”るヽの，＼
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2.1. Some relevant arguments in the Pramii!lavarttikasvavrtti 
2.1.1. Criticism of Dignaga's concept of sriiva!iatva 
、・ ; ；R’:， 
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As shown above, Dignaga's concept of specific indeterminate concerns his characteristic 
concept of vyatireka. Dharmakii1i, who tries to deny Dignaga's concept of vyatireka in order to 
establish his own theory of the logical nexus, cannot accept Dignaga's concept of specific inde-
terminate. Thus, we can find Dhai・makiiti's criticism of Dignaga's concept of'audibility'in the 
Pramti~avtirttikasvavrtti. Dharmakirti says: 
"Further,'on出eground of (met℃)non-perception, the specific (vise:rn) (indeterminate) would be 
a (valid) logical reason which is excluded (from the disimilar instance) (PV I 19ab)'. Audibility 
also would be a (valid) logical reason which is excluded from this (dissimilar instance) because 
(audibility) is excluded on the ground of (mere) non-perception botl1 from eternal出ingsand from 
non-eternal things. Namely, the exclusion is none other than the exclusion from山is(dissimilar 
instance). Nevertheless, (inreality) there is no exclusion, because for any (area) it is not deter-
mined whether (audibility) is excluded from (it)."12 ・
Here, Dharmakirti states that Dignaga's concept of specific indeterminate ~s inconsistent 
with Dharmakirti's system of logic. Dignaga regards'audibility'as a logical reason which is 
found neither in the similat・ inst皿cenor in the disirnilru.・ instance, and therefore satisfies the third 
condition of the three fo1ms. But that concept is possible, inasmuch as Dignaga asserted that the 
vyatireka is confirmed by mere non-perception. According to Dharmakiiti, who asserts that only 
the non-perception of a perceptible object (drfyanupalabdhi) can deternnne non-existence, it is 
not possible to say that'audibility'satisfies the third condition of the three forms. 
2.1.2. Criticism of Naiyayika's kevalavyatirekihetu 
From almost the same point of view, Dharmakirti refutes Uddyotakara's proof of the exist-
ence of a soul（titnuzn) which depends on'the pw・e negative logical reason'(kevalavyatirekil花tu).13
Dharmakirti says: 
"Fu1ther,'the (logical reason) which has (only) the negative concomitance (vyatirekin) would be a 
valid logical reason(PVI 18c)'(The opponent presents the following syllogism:)、Thisliving body 
(jivacharira) is not not endowed wi出asoul because (ifit is not endowed witl1 a soul) it would not 
have breatl1ing皿dthe like(pば~iidi)'. (He aserts that) one can recognize（出eexistence of) a soul 
in terms of excluding this (breathing and the like from the dissimilar instance like a pot), because 
breathing and由elike ai・e not found, whether出epot which is not endowed witl1 a soul is found or 
not found. (However) so fai・as one cannot prove the non-existence interms of non-perception of an 
imperceptible (soul), one cannot prove that the pot and the like are not endowed with a soul. 
Therefore, breathing and tl1e like are not excluded (from the disimilar instance)."14 
12PYSY 13,19:ki,??CI, vi均asyavyavac/1edaheh1ti syid adarsanit I(PV I I 9ab) s1'tivaiatva.1)1ipi ni tyini tyayor 
adarsantid vyavrtir it tadvyavacchedahetuti sytit. na hi tadvytivrter anyad vyavacchedanam. avyavacchedas /Lt 
kuta§cicl vydvrter CI/ini§caytit. 
13 Cf.NV 291,2, etc.; K. Kano (1987), "Shusaishin no sonzai ronsho to kevalavymi,-ekihetu" [The Proof of the 
Existence of God and kevalavyatirekihetu], Jndo Shisoshi Ken徊 5,1-27. 
14 PVSV 12,26f.: ki1?1 ca, vyatireky api hetu{1 syit I (PY l 18c) 1eda111iritm.akm1 jfvaccharfram 
aprli1adimatvap1'asa,igtid it. nirlirmake~·u ghaftidi~u dNftidr~fe~·u prti(1tidyadarsanti.t tanivrtylitmagatif:i sylit. 
,．、'・. 9.， ..＼が没'·'叫• ．：やe・,"9• 9,’
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Here Uddyotakara asse1ts that lis proof of the existence of a soul is valid because the logical 
reason'breathing and the like'has the negative concomitance. Dhaima匝tipoints out that the 
vyatireka is not confit・med because non-existence of the logical reason in the dissimilar instance 
is not necessarily confamed, and concludes that the pure negative logical reason does not satisfy 
the conditions of a valid logical reason. 15 
2.2. asiidhiira!zanaikantika in Dharmakirti's theory of hetvab血sa
Thus, Dharmakirti acknowledged eai・ly on that Dignaga's concept of specific indetenninate 
is problematic, and must have felt it necessary to re-define this falacious logical reason in order 
to reconcile it wit1 his own system of logic. Now, Dharrna虹rtideals intensively with the inves-
tigation of the specific indeterminate in the context of the description of the theory of fallacious 
logical reasons (hetvabhasa) in the Par記hanumanachapter of the Pran俎riavarttika.In fact, 
Dharmakirti describes his theory of fallacious logical reasons only partially in the fourth chapter 
of the Pramariavarttika and prolongs its completion until the third chapter of the Pramaria-
viniscaya.16 But he closely investigates the specific indeterminate in the Prama~vii.rttika. Thus, 
in what follows, I will examine Dharmak.Irti's theory of specific indeterminate, focusing on the 
statements in the fom-th chapter of the Pramariavarttika. 17 First I will briefly look at the context 
of the fourth chapter of tl1e Pramariavarttika, in which the specific indeterminate is discussed. 
2.2.1. The context of the description of asiid血ra~anaikiintikain the fourth chapter of the 
Pranziinavarttika 
In 285 verses of the fourth chapter of the Pran両uivarttika,Dhai・m皿 tideals with two main 
topics, namely, the thesis(pak?a) and the logical reason (hetu). The description concerning the 
logical reason begins with verse 189. After having considered the first condition of the logical 
reason(pak?adharmatva) in verses 189-194, Dharma畑tisets a program verse (195) in order to 
summai-ize lis classification of logical reasons. There, he interprets Dignaga's hetucakra from 
his own point of view as follows: 
"(In the hetucakra,) two (logical reasons) (ru・e stated) in order to establish that tl1e esential pmp-
erty (svabhiiva) and出eefect (kirya) (are valid logical reasons, and) two contradictory logical 
reasons（紅estated in order to indicate枷ittl1ey are fallacious).(Fu1ther), because of disagreement 
(witl1 opponents), the specific (bheda) and the general (siimanya) (are stated in order to indicate 
that they are falacious), (and) the rest establish出at(tl1e valid reason is confmned by) the exclu-
sion (from tl1e disimilru・ instance)." (PV N 195)18 
叫卵nupalambhiidabhlivisidhau ghaftidfl栢'!11ai1itmyisidhe(ip1i1ader anivrti(,. 
15 Dharma畑1ialso deals with the criticism of Naiyayika's prof of the existence of a soul in the later part of the 
Pmiiavc7rtikasvavrti. Cf. PVSV 154,21 f.; F. Omae (191), "Dharmakirti no sei itenkan-Pram面ava1tikadaish6 
oyobi jichu no wayaku (8)" [Dhanna畑tion Scripture—Japanese tmnslation of the fu・st chapter of the Pramiiwvtirtika 
and its Svavrti (8)], Nishinihon Shiikyogaku l.ashi 13, 79—94: 86f. 
16 As for a general view of Dharmakirti's theory of falacious logical reasons, cf. M. Ono (1987), "Dharma御
no gijironshoin setsu" [Dharmak1rti's Theory of hetvtibhlisaJ, Bukkyogaku 21, (I)ー(21).This article deals with 
Dharmak1rti's systematic description of the hetviblrtisa in the thfrd chapter of the Pmmliiiaviniscaya. 
17 I wilrefer to the paralels in the Pramli!'faviniS:caya in the notes. 
18 PY IV 195: svabhivakliryasidhyarthc1J1 dvau dvau hetuviparyayau I vivtidid bhedastimanye年0
??? ?? ャ；•6り；．9,·，
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Thus, in the Prama叩varttika,Dhru・m碑 tiattempts to establish his classification of logical 
reasons on the ground of Dignaga's hetucakra. First, in the verses 196--204, he strives to relate 
the two valid logical reasons in the hetucakra to his classification of valid logical reasons, i.e. the 
essential property and the effect⑲ Next, he goes on to explain'the specific', skipping the contra-
dictory logical reasons which come next in the program verse. 
加 explanationof the specific indetenninate begins with the verse 205, and continues to (at 
least) verse 259.20 In this pru・agraph, Dhru・makirti closely examines the concept of specific inde-
terminate. Here, it is a litle curious that Dhru・makirti first considers Naiyayika's pure negative 
logical reason, i.e.'breathing and the like', not the'audibility'which Dignaga indicated as an 
example of the specific u1determinate, although he does mention it afterwards.21 At any rate, as 
we saw above, Dhru・ma畑 tihas certainly realized in the Pramaiiavarttikasvavrtti that the pure 
negative logical reason and'audibility'have the same consa・uction. Thus, he identifies the pure 
negative logical reason with the specific indeterminate in this context, and explains why the pure 
negative logical reason, that is to say, the specific indeterminate, cannot be acknowledged as a 
valid logical reason. The reason why the purely negative logical reason is fallacious, is entirely 
different from the reason which Dignaga demonstrates concerning'audibility'. Namely, the 
meaning of the specific indeterminate is here drastically changed by Dhru・ma畑 ti.
vyivrtist7dhana(i I; PVin Il 203b3. 
19 Here Dhru・mak.Irti attempts to justify his new clasification of valid logical reasons by indicating that the two 
valid logical reasons inthe hetucak,-a a1-e dife1℃nt in their pervasion and this difference is also found between his two 
types of logical reasons. Cf. M. Ono (1985), "Dharmakirti no kukuin kaishaku" (Oh釘makirti'sInterpretation of the 
hetucakra], Hikaku Shiso no Michi 4, 81-85. 
20 As for the following part of the Pararthanumana chapter, verses 260-279 deal with the non-perception 
(anupalabdhi) and the verses 280-285 are concerned with the proof of momentarines (k~a11.ikatvlin11111lina). Ac-
cording to commentators, Dharmakirti explains the non-perception here because itis not mentioned in verse 195, 
although it is a type of valid logical reason (for example, PVP 321 b If.; PVV ad PV IV 260). In my opinion, however, 
the description of the non-perception and the proof of momentariness is involved with the issue of the specific 
indeterminate logical reason (cf. note 33; I wil mention verses 280-285 below). I suppose that the topic with which 
DhannakTrti deals in the last stage of his Pra1u1r1avlir1ti知wasthespeci(ic indetenninate logical reason. It is certain 
that DharmakT1ti did not complete the Par訓 11inuminachapter of the Pram励avirltika,or the whole Pm11li!7avtirtika, 
as Pmf. Frauwallner has already elucidated (cf. E. Frauwallner (1954), "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke 
Dharmakirti's," in Asiatica, Festschrift Friedrich Weller, Leipzig, 142-154). However, Prof. Frauwallner did not 
further persue the reason why DharmakTrti did not complete this work. We need to consider it. A clue is, in my 
opinion, the last problematic topic for DharmakTrti in the P1wnaiwv{ir1tika, i.e., the specifc indeterminate logical 
reason. 
21 If we compare Dhru・makirti's examples ofhetucakm in the PVin II with that of Dignaga (cf. note 5), we can 
easily recognize that only the example of the specific indeterminate isexchanged from'audibility'to'breathing and 
the like'by Dharmaku・ti (cf. PVin JU 203a3: phyogs灼ichos dgu bsran pa de dag ni gzhal bya yin pa'i phyir rtag 
go I byas pa'i phyir mi rtag go I mi rrag pa'i phyir rtsol ba las byung ba'o I byas pa'i phyir rtaf go I~ 
~I rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir rtag go I mi /'lag 
pa'i phyir rt sol ba las met bywig ba'o llmi rtag ste rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir ro I rtag ste /us can ma yi1 pa'i phyir 
,v zhes bya ba Ira b1'0 I). DharmakTrti probably considers in the PVin that'audibility'is not appropriate as a typical 
example of the specific indeterminate. I wil answer the question of why DharmakTrti had to change the example of 
the specific indeterminate below. 
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2.2.2. Dharmakirti's interpretation of asiidhiira{iiinaikiintika 
Let us now exainine how Dharmakuti re-interprets the meaning of the specific indetermi-
nate in the concrete statements in the Pararthanumana chapter of the Pramii~iaviirttika. At the 
beginning of the long discussion, Dharmak.Itti refutes Uddyotakara's proof of the existence of a 
soul, i.e.,、Theliving body is endowed with a soul. Because it has breatl1ing and the like': 
"The determination (aiki.intikatva) of the exclusion (from出edissimilar instance) means the inevi-
table nexus (avini.ibhava). But this (detennination) does not exist in (breathing and出elike) which 
紅enot necesru・ily connected (with a soul). On山eground of thls very (determination)，出eposi-
tive concomitance (anvaya) is established. Namely, if the identity or tile causality is established, (a 
logical reason) has the negative conco1nit皿ce.The1℃fore, nei出erthe negative concomitance nor 
the positive concomitance ru・e established witl1 respect to the specific (vi年a)(indeterminate logi-
cal reason, i.e., b1℃athing and the like)." (PV IV 205-206)22 
According to Dharm皿 ・ti,a logical reason has the inevitable nexus with what is to be proved 
(s叫hya),inasmuch as it has the negative concomitance. However, the inevitable nexus does not 
exist between a soul and'breathing and the like'because they are not necessarily connected on 
the ground of either the identity (tiidattnya) or the causality (tadutpatti). Therefore, logical rea-
sons such as'breathing and the like'in a proof of the existence of a soul are fallacious, because 
the inevitable nexus does not exist there, not because they have only the negative concomitance 
and lack the positive concmnitance, as Dignaga explained concerning the specific indeterminate. 
In Dhru・m皿 ti'ssystem of logic, whatever has the negative concomitance also has the positive 
concomitance. So, a logical reason which satisfies pak~adharmatva is valid, inasmuch as it has 
the negative concomitance. For Dh紅makirti,there is no logical reason which has only the nega-
tive concomitance. The reason why so-called'pure negative'logical reason is fallacious is, 
pru・adoxical as it may be, that it does not have the negative concotnitance in Dharmakuti's sense. 
Then Dhru・m皿 tiexplains the reason why Dignaga defines the specific indeterminate, i.e., 
'audibility'as a logical reason which satisfies only the third condition of the tlu・e forms, i.e., the 
negative conco1nitance, and does not satisfy the second condition of the three forms, i.e., the 
positive concomitance: 
22 PV IV 205-206: aikc7ntikaM1_n vyc7vrter avintibhiva ucyate I tac cantipratibaddhe~u tata e曲nvayasthitibI 
svitmatve hetubhi.ve vti siddhe hi vyatirekita I sidhyaty ato vise~e na vyatireko na ctinvayab I; PVin[l23b4f.: 
/dog pa'i rnam pa delta bu'i (D: bu P) smra ba des nimed na mi'byimg ba nyid (D: nyid du P) brjod par'gyur ro I 
,di /tar bdag med pa nyid la (D: med panyid la lacks P)med pa nyid do zhes don gyis bdag (D: bdag lacks P) la gnas 
pa gzhan da1g ma'bi-el par bstan par'gyur ro I de nyid kyis ni1jes su'gro ba grub pa'i phyir !dog pa can zhes brjod 
pa can yang (D: zhes b1jod pa can yang lacks P)ma yin no I med na mi'byung ba yang'brel pa yi1 na bdag 1yid 
'brel pa de ni(P：yin na yang D) de'i bdag n.yid dang de las byung ba las (D: bywig ba las lacks P) gzhan med do zhes 
bshad zin to I de dag kッangmthong ba med par mi'grub pa'i phyir srog lasogs pa med 1a mi'byung ba ma yin 
no I de nyid kyi phyir (P: de nyid紗isD) gang las I dog pa can (D: can lacks P) zhes brjod pa (P: b,jod pa yang D) 
bdag log (P: ma logs D) kyang'din,ges par (P:'bi-el par D) !dog pa yang ma yin no I'brel pa med pa ni'ga'zhig log 
na nges par I dog pa ma yin no (P:'brel pa med pa ni'ga'zhig log na nges par !dog pa ma yin no lacks D) I de bas 
1a khyad par ni ldog pa med pa dang,jes su'g,.oba med pa yin no I 
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"Depending on mere non-perception, (Dignaga)23 has explained that (the specific logical reason) 
has only the negative concomitance. (But in fact, the negative concomitance is not confirmed by 
mere non-perception.) Therefore, (the specific logical reason is) indeterminate. 
Otherwise (i.e., if the negative concomitance is confu-med by mere non-perception), (the specific 
logical reason) could prove (sometlling)." (PV IV 207)24 
The ground for Dignaga's assertion that the specific indeterminate satisfies the third condi-
tion of the three forms derives from the fact that'audibility'is merely not perceived in the dis-
similar instance, i.e., the non-eternal things (except sound). In the same manner, the ground for 
Uddyotak紅a'sassertion that the pure negative logical reason has the negative concomitance is 
no other than the fact that'breatlung and the like'are not perceived in the disinulai.・ inst皿ce,i.e., 
what is not endowed with a soul (except the living body) like a pot. For Dhai.makirti, the negative 
concomitance is not confirmed by mere non-perception. To be sure, a soul is not perceived in a 
pot which is not endowed with'breathing and the like'. But this non-perception does not neces-
sarily confirm that there is no soul in a pot. Dharmakirti explains this as follows: 
"[Opponents:] Because ilie non-existence of breathing and the like pervades the non-existence of a 
soul, breathing and the like would not exist, if a soul does not exist. 
[Answer:] It is not right, because tl1e non-existence of one (i.e., a soul) is not necessarily connected 
with the non-existence of another (i.e., breathing and the like). 
[Opponents:] (Breathing and the like are) essential properties of this (soul), or this (soul) causes 
(breatl,ing and the like). 
[Answer:] That is not right. If these (i.e., breathing and the like) are perceived when a soul is 
perceived, and (a soul) is not perceived when (breathing and the like)紅enot perceived, (the inevi-
table connection between a soul and breathing and the like) is established. And such perception 
and non-perception ai・e not established as far as a completely imperceptible object (atyantaparo紐a)
is concerned." (PY IV 208-210)25 
The negative concomitance of two things can be established, inasmuch as they ai.・e necessar— 
ily connected. And this necessary connection is basically confirmed by establishing between 
two things a condition that A is perceived when B isperceived and Bis not perceived when A is 
not perceived. As for the proof of the existence of a soul in question, the existence and non-
23 Cf. PVinT 156a2. 
24 PY IV 207: adt~fimlitram lidliya kevala,!1・ vyati,'ekitli I uktlinaiklintikas tasmiid anyathli gamako bhavet I; 
PVin Il 223b7: ma mthong ba tsam la brten nas slob dpon gyis mnyan par bya ba 1yid {dog pa can du bshad do I 
de tsam gyis med par rtogs pa ni ma yin no zhes bshad zin to I delta ma yin na the tshom gyi rgyu nyid du mi'gyur 
rel 
25 PY IV 208-210: prliuidyabhlivo nai成tmyavyliprtivini¥l(lrtane I lihnano vinivarteta pra1tidir yadi tac ca na I 
anyasya vinivrtytinyavinivrter ayogata~/ tadlitmti tatpm.1:ataS cen naitad titmopalambhane I tasyopalabdhliv agatliv 
agatau ca pmsidhyati I tectiryantaparok~asya d1~!Yadr~ffna sidhyata~II; PVin II 224al f.: srog la sogs pa med pas 
(D: med pas lacks P)bdag med pa la khyab pa'i phyir bdag log na srog la sogs pa {dog par'gyur 1.ozhe na ma yin 
le ma'brel pa med pas nye bar mi sbyor ba med pa la khyab pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro I gal le srog la sogs pa de'i 
bdag nyid dam (D: ma P) I delas bywig bas (P: ba D) bdag dang'bi-el pa yin na I dedag de log na !dog par'gyur bas 
de'i 1she srog la sogs pa med pas bdag med pa la (P: las D) khyab par'gyur ro I demed named par grub pas khyab 
pa grub pa'i phyir de yang mi'grub sle I bzlog (D: ldog P) pa la'brel pamed (D: ma grub P) pa'i phyir 1.o／dedag 
gi'brel pa ni dmigs pa dang mi dmigs pa dag las shes pa yin na I dedag 1i shin tu lkog tu gyur pa la mi'grub po I 
.,' .9;9.,;,,,, ：；恐；文：が，a3・, .:•、...，：~:•NI 
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existence of the logical reason'breathing and the like'can be recognized because they are per-
ceptible (drsya). But the existence and non-existence of a soul cannot be recognized because it is 
imperceptible (adrsya)凶 Becausea soul cannot be perceived at al, it is indeterminate whether 
it exists in a pot or not, even if it is not perceived in a pot. For Dharmakirti, as is often indicated, 
the non-existence must be confu-med by non-perception of a perceptible object (dr,約iinupalabdhi).
As a result, the ground for the fallacy of the pure negative logical reason, i.e., the specific indeter-
minate logical reason, is that both their positive and negative concomitance are doubtful 
(sa1J1digdha) because what is to be proved (siidhya) is imperceptible.27 
2.2.3. The position of sriiva~atva 
Thus, DharmakTrti drastically re-interprets Dignaga's term'the specific indeterminate'by 
criticizing Uddyotakara's concept of pure negative logical reason, and reconciles this term with 
his system of logic. However, he is not entirely free from Dignaga's u・aditions, because he insists 
that'audibility', which Dignaga indicates as an example of the specific indeterminate, be the 
specific indeterminate in Dharmakilti's sense as well. He says: 
"The breathing and the like are equal to audibility with respect to the deviation (vyabhicara). 
(Namely, both of them are devious because they are excluded also from the similru・ instance). 
[Opponents:] (They are) not (equal). The later (i.e., audibility) is devious, even if (it has) the 
negative concomitance. (But the former is not devious because it is not excluded from the similar 
instance.) 
[Answer:] Why (is audibility devious)? 
[Opponents:] Because this (audibility) is excluded not only from tl1e dissimilar instance(but also 
from the similar instance). 
[Answer:] Ifyou say so, it follows that there is no positive concomitance (anuvrtti) in the si1nilru・ 
instance concerning tl1is (audibility). (And) this (absence of the positive concomitance in the 
similar instance) is the same for anotl1er (logical reason, i.e., breathing and the like) as wel. That 
A is necessarily excluded from the disimilru・ instance (actually) means that A exists in the similar 
instance. That is the reason why (Digniiga) said tl1at'in terms of implication (arthipati) one of 
(two examples) indicates another'.28 Therefore, (in other words) the above-mentioned non-devia-
tion cannot be established, if the positive concomitance does not exist. And negation of negation is 
nothing else than affirmation." (PY IV 218-221)29 
26 Cf. PY IV 212: pri1ides ca kvacid dr~fyli. satvasatfl,aiJ1 pmtfyate I tathlitmli yadi drsyeta satvisatva1J1 
pratiyate I; PYin ll 24a4f.: srog la sogs pa yang 11tho1g ba nyid las la lar yod pa dang (D: dag P) med par rtogs 
pa yin no I bdag ni de /ta ma yin pa'i phyir de yod pa dang med par mi rtogs so I 
27 Cf. PVin Il 23a4f.: de nyid kyi p切ir(P: de nyid灼iphyir lacks D) 1jes su'gro ba dang /dog pa dag la (P: 
las D) the tshom za ba'i phyir ma 1ges pa yin te I delas bsgrub par bya ba dang cig zhos dag tu 1ges pa med pa'i 
phyir ro I Here, the concept of'doubtful'(sa,pdigdha) plays an important role. Dharmakirti crucialy uses this 
concept inclasifing the falacious logical reasons in the P1r1mti1wvi1ifca),{1. Cf. Ono [1987: (4)f.] 
28 Cf. note 1.
29 PY IV 218ー221：紐ivaiwtvenatat tulya,!t p⑩I(7di vyabhicdrafah/na tasya vyabhicdritvdd vyatirtke'pi cet 
katham I ntistidhytid eva vifle~·as tasya nanv evam UC)'{lie I stidhye'nuvrt)'abl面1,0＇rthittasytinyatrtipy asau sama(i I 
ascidhytid eva viccheda it s<1dhye'stitocyate I arthtipatylita evoktam ekena dvayadarfanamll Tdrgavyabhicli,v'to 
'nanvaye~·u na sidhyati Ipra麻edhani~·edha§ca vidhcintit krdrso 1ara(・1 I;PYin Il 24b5f.: s,vg la sags pa 111ya1. 
bya nyid dang'khrul par yang 11tshu1gs so I ma yin te de'i (P: de ni D) ldog pa'khrul pa'i phyir ro z;he 1a ji !tar 
•• ; . ，f悩．9：}.:：一
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Furthermore, at the end of the discourse on the specific indeterminate, Dharm咄血defends
Dignaga, who indicates'audibility', not the pure negative logical reason, as an example of the 
specific indeterminate with the following statement: 
、(Dignaga)made refei-ence to audibility in 01-der to indicate (that falacies of specific indeterminate 
logical reasons ru・e) the same. (Therefore), one should assume that each of them is a method of 
understanding that whatever has (only) the negative concomitance (vyatirekin) is not a (valid) 
logical reason." (PV IV 259)30 
Thus, Dharmakirti emphasizes that'audibility'is stil the specific indeterminate, because 
'audibility'and'breathing and the like'have the same fallacy.31 However, if the two logical 
reasons are the same in the fallacy, why-does Dharmakirti fast indicate the pure negative logical 
reason as an example of the specific indeterminate? One reason is undoubtedly that he has to 
criticize the syllogism which Uddyotakai・a established and Dignaga did not know. But a more 
essential reason is probably that it is inconvenient for him to criticize'audibility'directly, as we 
shall see below. 
3. asiidhiira~iinaikiintika and the development of DharmakirtPs logic—a hypothesis 
The foregoing investigation clearly shows Dharmakirti's basic view that the pure negative 
logical reason whose negative concomitance is confirmed by mere non-perception is in fact 
fallacious because its positive and negative concomitance are doubtful. It then follows that the 
inevitable connection (niintarfyakata), i.e., the positive and negative concomitance between a 
logical reason (sadhana) and what is to be proved (sadhya), must be ascertained not by mere non-
perception but by further valid logical reasons (sadhana) in order to confirm the validity of a 
logical reason立Dharmakirticonsiders the issue of the inevitable connection in verses 245-258. 
Here, I will not investigate the description of this section closely, but I should point out that 
Dharrnakirti deals mainly with the issue of the ascertainment of the inevitable connection in the 
'khrul I deni mthun(P：mi mt/um D) pa'i phyogs ma yin pa (D: par P) kho na las !dog pa 11ayi1pa'i phyir,v功ena/
des ni'di (D:'di lacks P)mtlum pa'i phyogs la Jtg pa med par brjod pa ma yin nam I deni gl)wn la yang mtshungs 
pa'i phyir/ji /tar srog la sogspa dang mi mtsh1111gslmthu11pa'i phyogs ma yin pa nyid la med do zhes bya bas ni (P: 
ni lacks D)'di mtlnm pa'i phyogs la yod par brjod pa yin. re I dgag pa gnyis kyi rnal ma go ba'i phyir ro I de /ta ma 
yin na mam par bead par bya ba 11a yin pa'i phyir 1iges par gzung ba'i'bras bu cir'gyur m (P: ro lacks D)I gcig la
nges par gzung ba med na ni I !dog pa mi'khrul par mi'grub pa'i (P:'khrul pa'i D) phyir,v I de nyid kyi phyir mthwz 
pa'i phyogs nyid la yod pa dang mtlnm pa'i phyogs ma yin pa nyid la med pa l}・1es ~
!1!1:f.Qfil (P: ba D) ~b1jod do I de'i phyir /dog pa mi'khrul pa'di'dm bani 1jes su'gro ba med par 
mi'grub poll grubna ni nangyis rjes su'gro ba'gugs parbyed de (P:'gug parbyeddo D)I de dgag pa bkag pa'i 1go 
bo ni sgrub pa'i,r:11,gbzhin yin pa'i phyir ro I 
30 PY IV 259: ahetutvagati1yliya(1 sa,10'ya1r1 vyati1-eki1w(1 I abhyiJhya(1 s1iva1iarvokte(1 krtayi(, slimyadrf.faye I 
31 Mo早kru・agupta,a later folower of Dharmakirli, also states: TBh 48, I—7: rah'lislidhira1c11aiktintiko yathli; 
slit11aka1J1 jfvaccharfmm, pri1lidimatvc7d apartl}fvaccharfravad ghafm>at. aya11 hetur aparajfvaccharTre lit11a1a 
vylipta it 1a 1iscitaf:,. ghafe ca vipak~e litma10'bhavi1 nivrtra iti naniscita(i. dharmi1i tuj和accharfrevidyafCI ity 
asidhira1linaikiimika ucyate. だ~;
se also Y Kajiyama (196), "An Introduction toBuddhist Philosophy: An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabha領
o「Mo早karagupta,"Memoirs of the Faculty of leters, Kyoto University 10, 1ー173,Kyoto: 13f. 
32 PY IV 246ab: nlintarfyakatli sli ca slidhana11 samapekfafe I 
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case of the efect as reason (kliryahetu), 3 and that concerning the ascertainment of the inevitable 
connection in the case of the essential property as reason (svabhiivahetu) he only suggests his 
basic idea as follows: 
"The inevitable connections of the esential prope1ty (svabhi.'"iva) (as reason) should be recognized 
respectively depending on logical reasons, as (I) have afready explained concerning perishment 
(vin巫a)and being produced (krtakatva)." (PV IV 258)34 
Namely, Dhai・makirti states that the inevitable connections of the essential property as rea-
son should be ascertained according to the method he himself uses in his'inference on the 
ground of perishment'(viniisitvlinumlina).35 In this statement, the issue of the specific indeter-
minate is related to one of Dharmal<Irti's most crucial topics, i.e., a proof of momentai-iness. This 
statement, in my opinion, is a starting point of a new development in Dharmakirti's logic. 
Taking into account the above discussion on the specific indete1minate, I would like to present 
a hypothesis, in terms of wl1ich we could answer the two important questions, i.e., why Dhai・mal<Irti 
did not complete his Prama~avlirttika, and what motivated him to reform his proof of momen-
tarines. 
As is mentioned above, according to Dharmakirti, the specific indeterminate logical reason 
is invalid, because its positive and negative conco1nit皿ceare doubtful, not because it is specific 
to the subject of a thesis and exists neither in the similar instance nor in the disi1nilar instance, as 
Dignaga explained. Namely, Uddyotakara's pure negative logical reason'breathing and the like' 
is regarded as the specific indeterminate, because its positive and negative concomit皿ceare 
doubげul.And the ultimate reason for this doubtfulness is that a soul, i.e., what is to be proved 
(slidhya), is imper℃eptible (adrsya). 
Here, we should recall that Dharma血tiregards'audibility'as the specific indeterminate, 
because'audibility'and'breathing and the like'are the same in the falacy. Therefore, Dharm皿 ・ti
must have admitted that the positive and negative concomitance between'audibility'and'eter-
nity/non-eternity'(nityatva/anityatva) are doubtful. And inasmuch as'audibility'is perceptible 
in essence, it follows that'eternity/non-eternity'is imperceptible（叫瓜ya)印 Onthe other hand, 
in the proof of momentai-iness which Dharm皿 :tipresented in the Pramli~avtirttikasvavrtti, the 
so-called'inference on the ground of perisl皿 ent',the thesis that things are non-eternal, is proved 
by ascertaining the inevitable connection between'being produced'(krtakatva) and'non-eter-
3 The isue of the inevitable conection in the case of the efect as reason concerns the isue of non-pe1℃eption 
(cf. PY IV 246 cd: ki,ye dr~fir adr~麻cakaIyakaranatdhile/I'.) That is the esential reason why Dharma畑tideals 
with non-pe1℃eption in verses 260-279 (cf. note 20). Th ere, non-perception is finaly grounded on self-cognition, 
and therefore, regresus ad i叩nitumis avoided (cf. PV IV 274: tasmlid anupalambho'ya'!1 svayw?tpratyak~ato 
gata(i I svamlitravruer gamakas tadabhtivavyavasthite(i!,/)． 
34 Cf.PV IV 258: nlintarfyakatlij1ieyli yarhlisva1Ji hetvapek~aya I svabhiivasya yarhoktaq1 prlik vinli紐
krtakatvayo(i I 
35 Cf. PVSV 98,4-10,24; 141,17-150,5. 
36 Dharmakirti probably noticed this inconvenient consequence. That is thereason why he did not directly 
criticize'audibility'as an example ofthe specific indeterminate. 
,·•,'.（1：?：叱••, 9 5、』¢a,-・',.;’
Dharmakrrti on asadharaiianaikdntika 313 
nity'. And this ascertainment essentially depends on the empirical fact of perishment.37 There-
fore, this ascertairunent is possible only if'non-eternity'is perceptible. If'non-eternity'is imper-
ceptible, this inference cannot function.38 
Thus, as a result of the re-inte1pretation of the concept of specific indeterminate, Dhru・makirti 
probably would have to reconsider his proof of momentariness presented in the Prama.ravtirttika-
svavrtti. His fragmentru・y description of'the inference on the ground of perishment'located at 
the end of the Pararth恥um恥achapter of the Pran俎ravarttika(PV IV 280-285) reveals a great 
deal about these circumstances. However, he does not seem to have been able to come to any 
appropriate solution at that time. In my opinion, that is the direct reason why Dharmakirti did not 
complete his main work, the Pramaravlirttika. Afterwards in the Pramaraviniscaya, he suc-
ceeded in solving this problem by establishing so-called'the inference on the ground of exist-
ence'(sattvtinumli.na). There, as is well known, he inti・oduced'the negative proof with reference 
to the conu·adictory'(viparyayabadhakaprama~ia) as a method, in terms of which one can a 
priori ascertain the inevitable connection without depending on any perception of the empirical 
fact. Thus, he drastically reformed the proof of momentariness.39 
Conversely, the establishment of sattvanw頑namight mean that the inevitable connection 
between'audibility'and'non-eternity'could also be ascertained by applying'the negative proof 
with reference to the contradictory'. Indeed, Jinendrabuddhi (8c.)40 observes that the inevitable 
connection between'audibility'and'non-eternity'can be ascertained by'the negative proof 
with reference to the conti・adictory'(i.e.,'whatever is eternal cannot have arthakriya'), and con-
eludes that'audibility'can be a valid logical reason.41 
37 Cf. E. Steinkellner (1968/69), "Die Entwicklung des k~ai:iikatviinumiinam bei Dharmakfrti," WZKSO 
12/13, 361-377: 366, 371. 
38 On the other hand, at the stage of the Prami!iavti.rtikasvavrni, Dharmakirti did not consider that a soul 
(iitman) and Buddhist dogmas which are included in the four noble truths (caturiiryasa加）suchas'everything is
non-eternal'are objects of the same kind of the inference. Namely, he states that the four noble truths are'objects of 
the inference not depending on the scripture'(aniigamiipek~iinumiinavi~aya), but that a soul is not so (cf. PVSV 
108,24f.: tathiinc7.gamapek~iinu111iinavi~ayiibhimatiinii1?1 tathiibhava~ yathti. cati,祝'imiryasatylinim. ananumeyiin励1,
tathibhivo yathitmidfl1ini.). From this point of view, the proof of momentariness in the Pramaraviirttikasvavrtti 
may not be invalid. 
39 Cf. Steinkelner [1968/69: 369f.]. However, inasmuch as thesa/fl1i1umina itself depends on Dharmakit・ti's 
definition of existence (cf. PY II 3ab: arthakriyiisamartha,?t yat tad atra paramarthasat/)，this new proof also 
cannot be accepted by those who do not accept Dharmakirti's ontology. For example, Akalarpka states that there is 
no essential diference between the keva/avyati,'ekin and the saflviinumtina (cf. SVT 206,16f.:jfvacharf1-e pri!ftidir 
yathiihetur niranvayit I tathti. sarva(i satvidir ahetu(i k~a11ike kvacit 111 [Everytling such as'existence'regarding 
a certain momentary (thing) is not les a (valid) logical reason than'breathing and the like'regaitling the living body, 
because the positive concomitance does not exist (in either cases).]). 
4° Cf. T. Funayama (1995), "Arca¥a, S iintarak~ita, Jinendrabuddhi, and Kamalasna on the aim of a treatise 
(prayojana)," WZKS 39, 181-201. 
41 Cf. PST 17la2:'o na mnyan par bya ba nyid ni rna bas gzung bar bya ba nyid de I rcmg gi rnampa can gyi 
rna ba'i rnam par shes pa'i rgyu nyid kyi mtshan nyid can yi,i z/ing I~灼irtagpa ni 
ma in te/rnam)a thams caddu don b Iednus Ja Ini’thad Ja'i h ir1,O／don byed nus pa'i mtshan nyid can yang 
dngos po zhes pa'di ni bshad zin to/Ides na mnyan par bya ba nyid mi rtag pa kho na la Jug go zhes pa'di ni the 
tshom med de I dena ci /tar 1jes su 11g pa dang /dog pa dag ma 1ges pa'i phyir,v zhes b1jod ce na I skyon'di med 
de I pha rol po'i rtag pa yang dngos por khas len te I des na de'i'dod pa la ltos pas de skad bshad do I rang gi lugs 
;9,： 1、・.,; , •，心；屯必：？,, ” ・ゾ'・’:
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Dhru・makirti himself insists not only in the Pram励avtirttika,but also in ilie Pram励aviniscaya
that'audibility'is the specific indeterminate as a kind of fallacious logical reason.42 And almost 
al of Buddhist logicians including Arca~a43 seem to hold that'audibility'is a fallacious logical 
reason, until Ratnakarasanti explicitly states that it is a valid logical reason.44 But inasmuch as 
the sattvtinun直nais established, we could say that for the later DharmakTrti there is no actual 
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